point is when welfare judgments are made based upon them, the observer must be making certain assumptions about the relation between income, its distribution, and the welfare of society. Depending on what these assumptions are, objective, statistical measures of income equality may or may not yield a correct indication of equality in the normative sense.
For example, in 1960 the state of Connecticut possessed a more equal distribution of income than did Oregon, as measured by Gini's concentration ratio. Using the coefficient of variation as the equality measure, however, Oregon's income distribution was the more equa1.l Given this inconsistency, and for whatever purpose such a comparison may be meaningful, which state had the preferred, more "equal" distribution of income? Quite clearly, since neither measure contains explicit normative inputs, the issue cannot be decided without reference to assumptions that relate income to welfare. A simple consensus that one measure is somehow "better" than the other is not at all a satisfactory substitute for such assumptions. As we shall see below, however, such a consensus may be viewed as implying certain welfare-income assumptions.
The methodology we shall employ in this paper in order to elaborate on the appropriateness, from a social welfare point-of-view, of various measures of income equality rests on the specification of a functional relationship between income and welfare. A theoretical equality measure is first derived via a general specification of the social welfare function and a maximization of welfare from a given income for society as a whole. The remainder of the paper is concerned with an empirical evaluation of the popular equality measures relative to this "idealyy measure.
While empirical necessity requires that we make some restrictive assumptions about the general income-welfare relationship, our results demonstrate that certain conclusions as to the appropriateness of the measures in question are rather insensitive to the specification of a social welfare function and may be therefore of greater generality than the assumptions imposed would dictate on an ex ante basis.
Let us begin by assuming there exists a functional relationship between income and welfare. Let
where xi is the income of the ith individual in society. Then W may be regarded as the appropriate social welfare function, which we shall further assume to possess the following properties :
It is also assumed that incomes are always non-negative. These assumptions in effect require that increments to social welfx-e by reason of increments to an individual's income are positive and that welfare increments decline as incomc increases. This particular form of the welfare function might be specificd by an egalitarian observer who judges that society is better off, ceteris paribus, when resources (in the form of money incomes) are equalized among individuals. In this case the rate at which incremental welfare declines in the social welfare function cxpresses the intensity of desire for the egalitarian society. Alternatively the function as specified by the conditions ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , and ( 4 ) might be viewed in the utilitarian sense that individuals have equal but declining capacities for the enjoyment of additional incomc. Presumably a desire to discuss the income distribution of society in a preferential sense reflects one or the other of these normative judgments.
Suppose that society in the aggregate receives money income I. It is a straightforward matter to show that the function W obtains a maximum for this fixed total incomc I when the following condition holds:
where X is the Lagrangian multiplier. Assumption ( 4 ) is sufficient for W to reach a maximum at that set of x,'s for which ( 5 ) holds. From equation ( 3 ) it follows directly that this optimum set of incomes occurs precisely when each individual in society receives an equal income, that is
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:rr / where 3 = Fx,/n = I/n. The maximum occurs when each individual receives the mean income. Thus any alternative distribution of incomes must, under the specifications adopted for W, produce social welfare at best equal to the distribution (X, . . . , 2). An index of equality for a given distribution may easily be defined in terms of its correspondence to the maximum possible welfare derivable from the total income I. Specifically, let the index be E, where
Large values of E denote greater equality in the distribution of the given income I. Considering equality of the income distribution in this fashion offers several advantages over "objective" definitions. First, (7) makes it quite clear that a social welfare function W(x,, . . . , x,) must be specified before equality judgments can be made in a preferential sense. Moreover, if society can specify the appropriate welfare function (or range of functions, as we will see later), then judgments can be made concerning policies affecting the distribution of income with confidence that those judgments reflect the specified function. Lastly, a comparison of equality judgments rendered by the traditional measures with analogous results obtained from an application of equation ( 7 ) under various assumptions about the form of W enables some introspection as to welfare functions implicit in each of the traditional measures, and hence their appropriateness viewed through the implicit assumptions.
Any actual attempt to compute E as defined by ( 7 ) must clearly include a specification of W in explicit form. And, to be sure, any such specification is arbitrary within the context of the class of admissible functions. In practice information about the income distribution appears as a grouped frequency distribution; any limiting assumption to be made will thus concern the interactions of individual incomes in W.
For our purposes the specification adopted is one of independence of individual income-welfare contributions at the margin. That is, we assume some W is given, where
Such an assumption is tantamount to an independence hypothesis of the form: so that interactions in the welfare function between individual incomes are presumed non-existent. While such interactions may be present in real-world society, this assumption is certainly more acceptable than its analogue in utility terms, where phenomena like "keeping up with the Joneses" are disallowed. Of course, ( 8 ) is also sufficient for the existence of Pareto optimality for the incomewelfare relationship.
Translating the assumption into terms amenable to an operational statement of E, if f ( x ) is the frequency distribution of income I in society and W ( x ) is the welfare function defined by ( 2 ) -( 4 ) and ( a ) , then E becomes:
As will be seen from the numerical results, the assumptions (2) and (8) may not be as limiting on ex post grounds as they might appear ex ante. At least the empirical evidence would suggest some degree of insensitivity of the results to variations in W ( x ) .
To implement comparisons of E and more traditional indicators of income equality, three forms of W ( x ) were selected, each reflecting the assumptions Based on these functions, the equality measure E was computed for 1960 family income distributions in the fifty states and the District of Columbia using various parameter specifications. Computations were then carried out for the "concentration ratio,"%oefficient of variation, Pareto's a and Gini's 6, and the percentage of aggregate income earned by the top one, five, and ten per cent of the income earner^.^ Table I shows the results for three selected E ( W ) forms and for the traditional measures of equality exclusive of the top five per cent measure which is omitted here in the interest of space. In each case the states have been ranked from greatest to least equality.
On inspection there appears to be a close relationship between most of the measures of equality considered. As between alternative normative indexes, the order of equality is not very different. Similarly, this ordering approximates closely the order generated by the concentration ratio and coefficient of variation, but less closely the ordering derived from the Pareto a, Gini 6 , and the per cent of aggregate income measures.
3. Not Gini's concentration ratio: Gini's ratio is the ratio of the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line to the total area enclosed by the 45-degree line. Hence, the closer this ratio to zero, the greater is equality. Haeinafter we refer to one minus this ratio as the "concentration ratio."
4. Both the Gini and Pareto lines were fitted only to those classes above the median class. Hence, any implications with regard to inequality apply only within the predescribed range (cf. Bowman 131). The excellence of fit obtained for the Pareto line applied to the high income tail of the distributions allows for a useful estimation procedure for determining class means in this range (cf. Appendix). Computing Pareto's a only for the upper tail yields values higher (absolutely) than would be obtained for the entire distribution; however, the original Pareto work was done using only the upper end of the income distribution since detailed data on the lower end of the distribution was not available in his time. OUT results suggest that the Pareto notion of a fixed a (1.50) should be re-evaluated, and bear directly upon the work of Mandelbrot [lo] . To formalize these findings, numerous comparisons were made between E ( R l ) , E(W2) and E(W3) with varying parameters f3, 4, and 8; the results are shown as the correlation matrix of Table 11 . Also computed was a more detailed comparison of E(WJ with the traditional measures of equality. These results are shown in Table 111 .
Regarding the usefulness of the welfare-oriented index as a measure of equality of income for policy purposes, the results in Table I1 demonstrate that the shape of @(x) is crucial to the order of equality derived from the index.
For example, when is used, El ( p = 1,000) has a correlation of only 0.25 with E1(P = 50,000). If society could not specify an appropriate welfare function well within this range, judgments about the relative equality of various income distributions would be meaningless.
On the other hand, as the blocked-out portions of Table 11 indicate, substantially high correlations appear between the various index forms with P ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 and $I and 8 ranging from 1,000 to 7,000. This suggests that reasonable policy judgments could be made about the relative equality of various income distributions if society could but spell out a welfare function W constrained within a range of parameters. Since the results are invariant to at least this extent under variations in w, an additional implication is that the limiting assumption about interaction phenomena may not be a serious shortcoming of the empirical model. Turning to the proposition that the traditional measures of income equality embody implicit welfare judgments, note the results of Table 111 and thc corresponding Figure 2: The concentration ratio ( G ) is highly correlated with E(W,) when p ranges from 500 to 8,000, and it would thus seem to be the preferred measure of equality if the appropriate welfare function were contained in this set of functions. As p increases, however, correlations between E and G fall and other measures become preferable. When P takes on a value around 10,000, then P5 and Plo seem to be more appropriate measures of equality; similarly, with P around 20,000, P1 is the best measure. And, interestingly, if /3 is allowed to increase to values of 50,000 and 100,000, the Pareto a and Gini 6 become the most appropriate of the traditional measures, in terms of their correspondence with the equality index.
The results of such comparisons bear on the implicit assumptions made as to the nature of the welfare function when the "traditional" measures of income equality are utilized. More precisely, when one uses the concentration ratio to measure equality, he assumes W1(/3 = 5,000) to be a more reasonable welfare function than WI(p = 50,000) ; otherwise, he should use an alternative measure, perhaps Pareto's a, as his measure of equality in its welfare connotation.
Another result of note concerns the apparent reasonableness of PI, P,, and Plo as measures of equality. They appear more adequate indicators of income equality than G or V when /3 is large. Such simple measures are useful when a paucity of data prevents use of more complex indexes. And, apparently these measures generate reasonably good judgments as to equality of the income distribution despite their simplicity.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS
It must be reiterated that the findings reached above depend upon the notion that income equality is appropriately measured in terms of the relative amount of welfare generated by income distributions. Granting this, then judgments about the equality of alternative distributions of income require more explicit designation of the welfare function than is commonly accorded such judgments.
While any welfare function must decline at the margin to make the preferability of a more equal distribution meaningful at all, the possible shapes for a welfare function which fits this constraint are manifold. We have used three such general functions, but many others might be incorporated along the lines indicated.
Lastly, it must be noted that if the welfare function were specified for policy purposes, the appropriate function to be maximized is not equality in terms of the index E, but rather that of aggregate welfare for society. For this reason, one could not conclude that any policy which generates more equality in terms of the index is necessarily a "good" policy. For exampIe, adopting a progressive income tax mightgenerate more equality, but if it impairs incentives to labor at the margin and hence reduces aggregate income and utility, it may be a "bad" policy in total welfare terms.
